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Abstract 
 
From parole prediction instruments and violent sexual predator 
scores to racial profiling on the highways, instruments to predict future 
dangerousness, drug-courier profiles, and IRS computer algorithms to 
detect tax evaders, the rise of actuarial methods in the field of crime and 
punishment presents a number of challenging issues at the intersection of 
economic theory, sociology, history, race studies, criminology, social 
theory, and law. The three review essays of Against Prediction by Ariela 
Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir, raise these challenges in their 
very best light. Ranging from the heights of poststructuralist and critical 
race theory to the intricate details of mathematical economics and 
criminological analysis, the essays apply different disciplinary lenses to 
the analysis of the actuarial turn offered in Against Prediction and set forth 
both substantive and structural challenges to the book. By means of a 
detailed reply to the three reviews, this essay provides a reader’s 
companion to Against Prediction.  
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1 |                                                                                                 Law & Social Inquiry 2008 
 
A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: 
 
A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir 
 on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation,  
Governmentality, and Race 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt1 
 
Introduction 
 
 In Against Prediction, I trace the rise of actuarial methods in the field of crime 
and punishment and offer three critiques of the use of accurate actuarial instruments. 
First, assuming a rational choice framework, the use of profiling techniques may actually 
increase crime in society under reasonably conservative assumptions. Therefore, profiling 
may be inefficient to the law enforcement goal of reducing crime. Second, putting aside 
rational choice premises and assuming only selective incapacitation, the use of actuarial 
instruments may produce a ratchet effect on members of the profiled population with 
highly detrimental consequences on their employment, educational, familial, and social 
outcomes. Third, the embrace of actuarial methods distorts our conceptions of just 
punishment by displacing a fundamental principle, namely that similarly-situated persons 
should be treated equally regardless of race, gender, national origin, or other group-
identifying traits. For all of these reasons, the presumption in the field of crime and 
punishment should be against prediction.   
 
 The insightful review essays of Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir 
raise a number of challenges at the intersection of economic modeling, social theory, 
history, race studies, and law. Ranging from the heights of poststructuralist and critical 
race theory to the intricate details of mathematical economics and criminological 
analysis, the essays pose important questions about each one of the three critiques in 
Against Prediction, as well as larger structural issues about the book. In order to 
accompany the reader systematically through the three critiques, I will address the review 
essays starting with the economic modeling. I will also begin with the substantive 
challenges and then turn to larger structural considerations.  
 
 It is rare indeed to have the opportunity to revisit a book one has written and 
published, especially a book that has been the subject of such close readings and 
critiques. It presents a unique occasion to clarify and reframe the written text. I offer this 
essay, then, as a reader’s companion to Against Prediction. 
                                                 
1 Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Chicago. I am deeply grateful to Ariela Gross, Yoram 
Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir for their insightful readings and critiques of Against Prediction; to Shai Lavi, the Taubenschlag Institute of 
Criminal Law, and the faculty at Tel Aviv University for a fascinating symposium on the book; to Martha Minow and Carol Steiker for 
detailed comments on an early draft; to Mariana Valverde and Andrew Dilts for comments and stimulating conversations on Foucault’s 
Collège de France lectures; and to Pat O’Malley, Frederick Schauer, Susan Silbey, Tanina Rostain, and Lucia Zedner for rich debates. 
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I. Revisiting the Three Critiques 
 
A. Efficiency, Pure Theory, and the Full Economic Model 
 
 The use of actuarial methods—which I define specifically as prediction 
instruments that rely on statistical disparities between group offending rates (Harcourt 
2007a, 1)—may backfire and increase crime under conservative assumptions. If members 
of the profiled group are less elastic to policing than members of the non-profiled 
group—if they respond less intensely and are less deterred by any increased 
surveillance—then profiling them for purposes of policing and punishment may be 
inefficient to the law enforcement objective of reducing crime.2  
 
 In his essay “In Defense of Prediction,” Margalioth argues that this first critique is 
technically accurate with regard to existing profiling techniques, but that the existing 
techniques are error-prone insofar as they do not incorporate a measure of the 
comparative responsiveness of the different populations. Though technically accurate, 
Margalioth emphasizes, my first critique should not undermine our faith in the efficiency 
of profiling techniques when they are properly administered. The correct use of statistical 
discrimination is “always efficient in theory,” Margalioth writes. An argument against 
profiling “may be justified only if interpreted as a positive account that criticizes the 
current, misguided, use of profiling” (Margalioth 2007, __). As a result, Margalioth urges 
that we not be against prediction, but only against our current practices of profiling.   
 
 Margalioth and I are entirely in agreement on this important theoretical point, 
which in fact is the very basis of my first critique. There is no question that if we had 
perfect information on the comparative elasticities and offending rates of the two groups 
at the margin, then we could administer statistical discrimination efficiently and ensure 
that there are no negative effects on crime. I demonstrate this in Against Prediction using 
an economic model of the social costs associated with profiling and crime. More 
specifically, I use a traditional cost function to derive the precise first-order condition 
that must necessarily be met in order for profiling to increase social welfare by 
decreasing total social costs (Harcourt 2007a, 133). I find that profiling will only 
decrease costs in society—and therefore be efficient—under specific conditions relating 
the comparative elasticities and offending rates to the comparative internal search rates of 
the two different groups.3 
                                                 
2  The term “elastic to policing” or more generally the notion of the “elasticity of offending to policing” refers to the degree to 
which changes in policing affect changes in offending. For example, an individual who is very elastic to policing will decrease his 
offending a lot when he is policed more; an individual who is less elastic to policing will decrease his offending less in response to the 
same increase in policing.    
3  The exact equation is specified at Harcourt 2007a:133, but is rewritten here using a bit more English: 
 
profilednon
profilednon
profilednon
profiled
profiled
profiled SearchRate
Offending
Elasticity
SearchRate
Offending
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−
−
− ×=×  
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  To help visualize this first-order condition, I use the case of racial profiling and 
demonstrate how to profile efficiently in one simple table (Harcourt 2007a, 134). I will 
add a few identifiers to the cells in order to facilitate the discussion and reproduce the full 
table here. For purposes of the table, EM  stands for the elasticity of minorities and EW for 
the elasticity of whites; OM for the offending rate of minorities and OW for the offending 
rate of whites; and IM for the internal search rate of minorities and IW for the internal 
search rate of whites:               
 
Table:  Minimizing Total Social Costs 
 
 
 
EM  =  EW EM  <  EW EM  >  EW 
OM  =  OW 
[1] 
 
IM  =  IW 
(No Racial Profiling) 
[2] 
 
IM  <  IW 
(Profile Whites) 
[3] 
 
IM  >  IW 
(Profile Minorities) 
 
OM  >  OW 
[4] 
 
IM  >  IW 
(Profile Minorities) 
[5] 
 
IM  <  IW [OM / OW] 
(Depends) 
[6] 
 
IM  >  IW 
(Profile Minorities) 
 
OM  <  OW 
[7] 
 
IM  <  IW 
(Profile Whites) 
[8] 
 
IM  <  IW 
(Profile Whites) 
[9] 
 
IM  >  IW [OM / OW] 
(Depends) 
 
 
 The first full row of the table addresses the situation where both minorities and 
whites have the same offending rates. Cell 1 tells us that if the two groups also have 
identical responsiveness to policing, then law enforcement should not engage in any form 
of racial profiling, but should instead police color-blind. Cell 2 tells us that if minorities 
have lower elasticity than whites, then the police should profile whites; and cell 3 tells us 
the inverse: if minorities have greater elasticity than whites, then the police should profile 
minorities.   
 
The second full row addresses a situation where minorities have a higher 
offending rate than whites. Cells 4 and 6 tell us that profiling minorities will be efficient 
and reduce overall social costs if the elasticity of minorities is greater than or equal to the 
elasticity of whites. However, cell 5 tells us that if minorities are less elastic to policing, 
then profiling minorities will only be efficient if the ratio of minority to white internal 
search rates is less than the ratio of minority to white offending rates. The third full row 
addresses a situation where whites have a higher offending rate than minorities and is 
essentially the reverse image of the second full row.   
 
Margalioth writes in his essay, “In fact, if we assume, as Harcourt does, that 
[minorities] have lower elasticity compared to whites, this does not mean that racial 
profiling is not efficient. It means that using racial profiling to target whites may 
minimize total criminal activity (Blumkin and Margalioth 2006, 318)” (Margalioth 2007, 
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__). Margalioth is absolutely right and his argument is reflected in cells 2, 5, and 8. 
Notice that in cell 5—under conditions of lesser minority elasticity, but higher minority 
offending—we should only target whites on efficiency grounds depending on the exact 
relationship between comparative offending rates and comparative internal search rates.  
 
 The table demonstrates that, if we knew the exact comparative elasiticities, 
offending, and internal search rates, then we could determine whether and whom to 
profile perfectly efficiently. In this sense, at the level of pure theory, the use of statistical 
discrimination is indeed always efficient.  
 
 Where Margalioth and I part ways, though, is on the importance to place on the 
theoretical versus the actual. The fact is, we do not have any data on comparative 
elasticities, and, until now, the social scientists who have been working on these actuarial 
instruments have never paid any attention to comparative elasticities. From the very first 
prediction tool onwards, researchers have based their instruments on comparative 
offending rates as the outcome measure. From Ernest Burgess, who developed the very 
first prediction tables implemented in the twentieth century, to the DEA agents who 
developed the drug-courier profile in the 1970s, to the most up-to-date sexual offender 
risk assessment instruments—all of the profiling instruments are based on offending 
differentials only. In other words, throughout the twentieth century and now into the 
twenty-first, actuarial methods are tied to differences in offending rates. The actuarial 
research—practical and theoretical—has never measured comparative elasticities. The 
result is that, today, we know effectively nothing about comparative elasticities.4 
 
It is precisely for this reason that I defined “actuarial methods” narrowly and 
specifically at the outset of Against Prediction as the “use of statistical rather than clinical 
methods on large datasets to determine different levels of criminal offending associated 
with one or more group traits, in order (1) to predict past, present, or future criminal 
behavior and (2) to administer a criminal justice outcome” (Harcourt 2007a, 1, emphasis 
added). This definition reflects, most accurately, what actuarial methods mean today and 
for the foreseeable future.  
 
 The pure theory of statistical discrimination is so divorced from our current state 
of knowledge and from our existing profiling techniques that the more meaningful 
conclusion to draw is that our actuarial instruments are potentially inefficient. Today and 
for the foreseeable future, we should remain against prediction. 
 
                                                 
4 It is only within the time frame of the writing of this book and the earlier articles from which it grew (Harcourt 2004, 2003a, and 
2003b) that researchers have begun to consider the implication of comparative elasticities to profiling. At the theoretical level, Nicola 
Persico raised the possibility of inefficiency in an article in 2002 (Persico 2002), but only recently have comparative elasticities begun 
to be included in the mathematical models (Harcourt 2004; Dominitz and Knowles 2005; Blumkin and Margalioth 2006; Bjerk 2007). 
At the empirical level, Avner Bar-Ilan and Bruce Sacerdote have a working paper from 2001 that explores the comparative 
responsiveness to an increase in the fine for running a red light along several dimensions—finding that the elasticity of red light 
running with respect to the fine “is larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars,” equivalent for drivers “convicted of violent 
offenses or property offenses,” and smallest, within Israel, for “members of ethnic minority groups.” In addition, Paul Heaton has a 
2006 working paper on the effect of eliminating racial profiling policies in New Jersey on the offending of minorities; however, the 
policing intervention in New Jersey involved no de-policing of whites, so there is no proper way to assess how the elasticity of black 
offenders compared to that of whites. The bottom line is that we still do not know anything about real comparative elasticities in the 
United States.   
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 These remarks help clarify two other important points that Margalioth raises in his 
essay. First, as Margalioth writes, “The difference in group size is irrelevant” (Margalioth 
2007, __). Margalioth is right and if there is anything in Against Prediction that suggests 
otherwise, it is the inadvertent product of trying to make the proofs accessible without 
using calculus.5 Group size does not matter to the first-order condition for efficiency. 
This should be evident from the equation and the table reproduced above: there is nothing 
in the equation or in the table that goes to the relative sizes of the populations. If there is 
any confusion in the text of Against Prediction, I would like to clarify the point here: 
Group size does not matter.   
 
Second, as I emphasize in the text, I do not know how the elasticies compare as 
between minorities and whites—or for that matter as between any two groups in society.6 
This is, as Margalioth suggests, an “open question” as an empirical matter. My purpose in 
the text is not to claim that profiled groups have lower elasticity, but rather to suggest that 
there are common sense reasons to suspect that a group with a higher offending rate may 
also have lower elasticity than the general population. The reasons are that there may be 
antecedent conditions—socio-economic, education-related, familial, cultural or other—
that explain both the higher offending and any potential difference in elasticity. This is, 
however, a theoretical claim for which there is at present no empirical evidence—which 
is precisely the problem.  
 
B. The “Ratchet Effect,” Selective Incapacitation, and Social Engineering 
 
If we put aside for a moment all rational choice assumptions and imagine that 
people are perfectly inelastic to policing, then the use of actuarial methods will be an 
efficient means to detect more crime. Profiling will increase the effectiveness of policing 
and punishing. But these benefits come at a price: the use of actuarial methods will cause 
a “ratchet effect” on the profiled population, such that members of the profiled group will 
be overrepresented in terms of carceral contacts (arrests, searches, detentions, 
convictions, incarcerations) in relation to their representation in the offending population. 
 
The basic intuition is that policing is like sampling: when the police profile 
higher-offending individuals, they are effectively sampling more from that higher-
offending group. The resulting set of successful searches will contain a disproportionate 
number of those high-offending individuals—disproportionate as compared to their 
representation in the offending population. This imbalance will get incrementally worse 
each year if law enforcement departments rely on the evidence of last year’s correctional 
                                                 
5 Margalioth is right that I do discuss group size in some of the early models on pages 126 and 131 and in Appendix B. The reason 
is that, in those models, I am using real (though hypothetical) numbers to make the analysis clear to the lay reader. I was trying to 
avoid using calculus as much as possible to make the proofs more accessible, and those early models therefore use actual numbers and 
proportions. But in the formal and exact model that uses derivatives, it is clear that the proportional size of the groups does not matter 
to the first-order condition for efficiency.   
6 This is especially true in the context of profiling as a counter-terrorism measure. As I discuss in Against Prediction (2007a, 227-
236) and develop at further length in “Muslim Profiles Post 9/11” (Harcourt 2007d), it is extremely difficult to know how the 
elasticities of different groups compare in the terrorism context. The efficiency of profiling will turn on whether any immediate gains 
from profiling will be offset by long-term substitution effects—i.e. by whether terrorist organizations can recruit from outside the 
profiled group—but those long-term effects are extremely hard to predict precisely because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
comparative elasticities.    
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traces—arrest or conviction rates—in order to set next year’s profiling targets. The 
resulting ratchet effect will have significant detrimental consequences on the 
employment, educational, familial, and social outcomes of the profiled populations—
including, in the case of racial profiling, the devastating effects associated with the notion 
of Black criminality that pervades the public imagination (Roberts 1999, 805) and, in the 
case of recidivists, the extreme difficulties of prisoner reentry (Travis 2000). The high 
costs associated with any ratchet effect should temper our embrace of the actuarial.    
 
 None of the review essays challenges the idea of a ratchet under conditions of 
non-elasticity. Margalioth correctly observes that if the populations are completely 
inelastic, then a perfectly efficient police officer would always and exclusively want to 
search members of the higher-offending group. On efficiency grounds, the police would 
not ratchet up, but rather search only the profiled population. Margalioth is right that this 
would eliminate subsequent ratchets—in other words, that it would eliminate subsequent 
ratchets as incremental processes operating over time. It would not, however, eliminate a 
one-time ratchet that would create the full disparity. As a result, the consequences are 
similar. Whether the ratchet occurs in one period only or over time, it would create a 
stark imbalance between the offending and carceral distributions with detrimental effects 
on the profiled population.  
 
 In his essay “Against Prevention?”, however, Sapir does urge me to go further in 
my critique. Sapir argues that if we assume that the predictions are accurate—a point I 
will return to later—then we may need additional arguments against selective 
incapacitation. “If it does in fact work and if we can predict who is likely to re-offend,” 
Sapir asks, “is it not legitimate to put them away for a longer period of time? Don’t we 
need more robust reasons to be opposed to selective incapacitation?” (Sapir 2007, __). 
 
Sapir offers two additional reasons. The first is that incapacitation punishes for 
suspicious traits and future acts, rather than for the past criminal act itself: “we do not 
punish people for wrongs they did, but we make them suffer for possessing certain traits 
or belonging to certain groups” (Sapir 2007, __). I agree with this first argument and 
believe that it is reflected in my third critique—namely that actuarial methods distort our 
fundamental principle that equally situated persons should be treated alike. Selective 
incapacitation no longer treats offenders as equals for having committed a crime, but 
instead looks at group traits—race, prior record, family background—to determine 
similarity. Like Sapir, I find this deeply troubling.  
 
Sapir’s second argument is that incapacitation amounts to “the State’s shirking its 
responsibility to deal with the causes of crime” (Sapir 2007: __). The turn to actuarial 
methods and selective incapacitation, Sapir notes, is “a reflection of the fact that we have 
given up on trying to reduce crime by investing in job opportunities, education, assistance 
to immigrants, drug rehabilitation programs, reentry programs and the like. We have also 
given up on punitive measures that keep the offender in the community” (Sapir 2007:__). 
On this score, I must confess, I am no longer convinced that the state is in a strong 
position to identify properly the causes of crime or to propose the kinds of solutions that I 
might agree with. I have become increasingly skeptical of our ability to empirically verify 
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criminological and punishment theories, especially those that intermediate through 
human consciousness, such as deterrence and rehabilitation theories, as well as social 
influence and legitimacy theories. I have found that even the most technical and savvy 
statistical analyses, econometric models, and qualitative research often fall short of their 
stated conclusions (Harcourt 2006b, Chapter 14). I have sketched out my increasing 
skepticism about the role of scientific discourse in the field of crime and punishment in a 
recent essay titled Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment (Harcourt 2006a). In the 
essay, I suggest that our lack of empirical knowledge should chasten our crime and 
punishment claims, and make us perhaps rely more on chance and randomization. I will 
not elaborate those points further here, but suggest only that they raise serious doubts 
about the ability of the state to properly identify and deal with the causes of crime. The 
track record, as I see it, is abysmal. This leaves me favoring less rather than more 
government intervention in the crime and punishment area across the board—not only as 
it relates to the actuarial turn (or, as I have argued elsewhere, to order-maintenance), but 
also as it relates to community-based punishment practices as well as larger public 
policies that are justified on the basis of crime-fighting. I am deeply concerned that the 
rhetoric of fighting crime is far too powerful a tool and tends to exercise too much 
justificatory force.   
 
Though we may disagree here, the exchange with Sapir elucidates two corollary 
but important points. First, my second critique involves a cost-benefit analysis and, as a 
result, it requires that we carefully calibrate our conclusions to any potential benefits. 
Some benefits may be so great that we may be willing to pay the price of a ratchet. It is 
for this reason that I make a distinction based on the egregiousness of the criminal 
offense. Sapir is undoubtedly right that the category of “heinous and egregious crimes” is 
theoretically problematic and ideologically loaded. But that, I take it, is inevitable and it 
points to our responsibility, as ethical and political agents, to properly police those 
ideological lines.7  
 
Second, Sapir draws our attention to the distinction between punishment and 
regulatory prevention, and asks why Against Prediction is limited to punishment only. 
This is an important intervention. My three critiques of prediction do indeed extend 
beyond the penal sphere to the area of preventative detention and civil commitment, and I 
discuss the case of violent sexual predators (Harcourt 2007a, 14). The first two critiques 
operate in exactly the same fashion, and the third critique is also perfectly relevant as 
long as we are willing to question—as I and others, including Sapir and Carol Steiker 
(1997) are—the jurisprudential distinction between preventative, administrative practices 
and punitive sanctions. Once again, the harms may need to be recalibrated in the event 
that they are any less severe, but the analytic framework applies flawlessly.  
 
                                                 
7  In contrast to the “ratchet effect” critique, the first critique addresses only the purported efficiency benefits of profiling 
(assuming a rational choice framework and deterrence) and demonstrates that those benefits themselves may be elusive. It does not 
reach the next stage of a cost-benefit analysis and does not assess potential costs, since it offers an internal critique of the law 
enforcement rationale for profiling. The third critique—which I discuss next—includes a normative argument about just punishment. 
There is no reason, though, that a consequentialist thinker could not assess the third critique through a cost-benefit lens. Not everyone 
will want to do so—especially not deontologists or social theorists—but it is not impervious to a cost-benefit analysis. For these 
reasons, the egregiousness of the criminal offense is potentially relevant to all three critiques.  
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C. Distorting Our Conception of Just Punishment: Foucault on Discipline, 
Governmentality, and Power/Knowledge 
 
 If profiling is potentially inefficient or alternatively may come at too high a price, 
then how exactly did actuarial instruments develop such traction in the field of crime and 
punishment? Why have they begun to colonize our thinking and practices of policing and 
punishing? The answer is complex but tied to what I call “the pull of prediction”: our 
technical advances in the ability to collect data, categorize, compute, and predict have 
seduced us into believing that future dangerousness is at the core of just punishment. Our 
desire to know the criminal, to categorize him and insure against future risk has led us to 
embrace the actuarial turn and, in the process, has displaced a fundamental tenet of just 
punishment, namely that similarly-situated persons should be treated equally regardless 
of their membership in any particular ethnic, racial, or other group.  
 
 Gross, in her essay “History, Race and Prediction,” and Sapir urge me to locate 
this third critique more explicitly within the Foucauldian models of discipline and 
governmentality. “Foucault, who was so present in Harcourt’s first book, lies only 
beneath the surface in Against Prediction,” Sapir writes, and “a more explicit engagement 
with Foucault” would have helped decipher the links between, inter alia, actuarial and 
clinical methods (Sapir 2007,__). Gross outlines how the actuarial turn in crime and 
punishment could be located within the context of “changing thinking about risk in a 
variety of fields of law” and suggests that these changes can be usefully analyzed from “a 
Foucauldian perspective” (Gross 2007,__).   
 
 It is indeed important to relate “the pull of prediction” back to Michel Foucault’s 
work, if only to shed light on the unique and theoretically ambiguous nature of the 
actuarial turn. The truth is, the actuarial fits uncomfortably in the two dominant 
Foucauldian frameworks—discipline and governmentality. The first model, brilliantly 
developed in Discipline and Punish, serves well to interpret and analyze the rehabilitative 
project that blossomed in corrections through the mid-twentieth century. Discipline, 
which was trained on the soul of the individual and sought to transform, reshape, and 
correct the delinquent—after, naturally, having constructed the delinquent—was 
intimately connected with the actuarial project. As I emphasize in Against Prediction, the 
actuarial impulse grew precisely from a desire to know the individual offender better and 
to administer an individual outcome with greater precision, in the context of both “the 
individualization of punishment”—to borrow the title of Raymond Saleilles’ famous 
1898 monograph—and the advent of indeterminate sentencing, parole boards, and the 
turn to rehabilitation (Harcourt 2007a, 42-45). The actuarial emerged first in the parole 
context as a way to assess whether a particular prisoner was likely to have been 
rehabilitated and could be paroled safely. Actuarial instruments were a central component 
of the individualization of punishment—which is vital to the third critique because I 
would like to suggest, contra Frederick Schauer (2003), that the actuarial was not about a 
preference for the general over the particular. To the contrary, it fed perfectly into the 
disciplinary project to “control the individual, neutralize his dangerousness, modify his 
criminal dispositions, and to only stop when those effects have been achieved” (Foucault 
1975, 23).    
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But the actuarial fits uncomfortably in the disciplinary framework because it no 
longer seeks to normalize the delinquent in the same manner. There are also important 
differences with regard to the role of the judge. At the height of the disciplinary, the 
judge no longer simply determined guilt, but instead embodied a wide range of expertise 
from psychiatry, to counseling, to social work, to education, administration, and 
correction, and took responsibility for the soul of the convict (Foucault 1975, 22-27). 
Now, by contrast, the use of actuarial instruments has de-responsibilized the judge and 
parole board member. Now they simply fill in a table, add a few numbers, and read the 
answer. The judge is no longer an expert, but a mere scribe, a rapporteur. Others have 
done the work and they have the expertise—the “actuarians,” as the state of Illinois 
referred to them explicitly in the 1930s. This de-responsibilization is captured nowhere as 
well as in a passage from the leading parole board authority’s Handbook for New Parole 
Board Members: “The thing that keeps parole board members awake at night is the fear 
that they will release someone and that person will commit a serious crime. . . .  
Validated, actuarial risk assessment tools can significantly increase your ability to assess 
risk more accurately” (2003, 35). 
 
 None of this fits well with the disciplinary model, and, for this reason, many have 
been tempted to explore Foucault’s later lectures on biopolitics and governmentality. In 
those lectures, delivered at the Collège de France between 1976 and 1979, Foucault 
began to sketch a theoretical framework that revolved around the idea of “sécurité”—
which he later renamed “governmentality”—and populations, a framework that seemed 
to apply better to the emerging practices of selective incapacitation. It was focused on 
populations rather than the individual. Foucault played with a number of different 
illustrations to distinguish the concept of governmentality from that of discipline, none 
better though than the example of the different responses to epidemics over the centuries: 
while the juridical model of exclusion was reflected in the exclusion of lepers in the 
Middle Ages, and the disciplinary model of control was reflected in the regimentation of 
the plague in the 16th and 17th centuries, the biopolitical model of population management 
is reflected in the administrative apparatus applied to the outbreak of smallpox beginning 
in the 18th century. This last model—a type of the larger category of governmentality—
manifested itself “completely differently” and in the following terms: “not so much to 
impose a discipline, though there is some recourse to that, but rather to count how many 
people have smallpox, at what age and with what effects, what mortality, what lesions, 
what consequences, what risks we take with inoculation, what is the probability that an 
individual might die or get smallpox despite being inoculated, what are the statistical 
effects on the population in general” (Foucault 2004a, 12).  
 
The concept of governmentality that Foucault began to sketch in his lectures has 
been elaborated since the 1990s by a number of critical theorists (see, e.g., Rose and 
Miller 1992; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991) and continues to guide critical work 
today. Giorgio Agamben made fruitful use of the model of biopolitics—as a form of 
governmentality—in Homo Sacer (1998), where he describes how political regimes 
measure, control, regulate, and manipulate populations from the perspective of bare 
life—of mere physical existence. In their discussion of the “new penology,” Malcolm 
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Feeley and Jonathan Simon locate the actuarial precisely within the governmentality 
paradigm (Feeley and Simon 1992, 450 and 452).  
 
Ariela Gross rightly draws on the governmentality framework, suggesting that the 
engineers of the actuarial may not in fact be focused on individual correction and 
rehabilitation, nor on crime reduction and deterrence, but instead merely on managing 
and counting populations (Gross 2007, __). These elements of the actuarial do indeed 
lend themselves to the idea of governmentality—of regulating populations, not individual 
souls, of securitizing, neutralizing, documenting, and controlling large groups of persons. 
But the focus on populations rather than individuals misses one of the central dimensions 
of the actuarial—namely, the desire to individualize the prediction and reduce false 
positives, to determine whether this particular offender is likely to reoffend, is a 
dangerous person, is a violent sexual predator. It is the specific and particular sexual 
offender across the street from you, living in that apartment or house that you can see 
through your window, that we must identify, document, publicize, and contain or 
exclude. To be sure, the extent of this individualizing impulse to predict better may 
resonate more in some contexts than in others—in the case of sexual predators, for 
example, as well as parole releases, IRS audits, and federal sentencing. Gross’s 
contribution is precisely to question how well it resonates in the case of racial profiling 
and to ask whether the individualizing impulse is performed differently with regard to 
young men of color. This is an important corrective and it suggests that we may need to 
individualize our own analysis of the different tools and actuarial techniques. But there 
remains, to my mind, an important disjuncture between these actuarial impulses and the 
idea of simply managing populations. The desire to predict, especially the desire to 
minimize false positives, remains an individualizing impulse.    
 
 As a result, I have not found it especially helpful to deploy either Foucault’s 
disciplinary or governmentality frameworks. The mixing and matching of these different 
lenses—and the inherent contradictions—do not advance our understanding of the 
actuarial turn. This is why I thought it better, this time around, to rely instead on the 
overarching theoretical framework of the will to knowledge. In this project I thus 
explored the set of concrete desires that I see reflected in the actuarial turn: the desire to 
know the criminal, the urge to categorize, and the impulse to insure. It is these concrete 
desires and impulses that help make better sense of the embrace of actuarial instruments. 
The desire to count, to predict, to know—the desire, in Hacking’s words, to tame 
chance—reflects precisely the desire to control the future by knowing individuals.  
 
 In this sense, the theoretical intervention in Against Prediction draws importantly 
on the broader poststructuralist insight regarding power/knowledge (see generally 
Harcourt 2007b), as well as on the writings of Ian Hacking (1990) and Nikolas Rose 
(2002) and the idea of taming chance—the idea of using probabilistic methods to control 
the individual and shape the future (Harcourt 2007a, 41-45).8 Like Mariana Valverde 
(2007, 160), my approach contests the idea that governmentality is a new mode of 
governance that, in an epochal or evolutionary way, has displaced discipline. Discipline 
                                                 
8  It also draws, in the more specific discussion of the urge to insure, on the work of Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon (2002) who 
are continuing to explore notions of risk and insurance (Harcourt 2007a, 185). 
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and governmentality coexist—along with other forms of governance such as biopolitics 
and sovereignty (see Harcourt 2001:149-150). Unlike Valverde, though, my approach 
emphasizes the larger power/knowledge dimension and, especially, the ‘will to know’ 
project that others, such as Hacking, have emphasized in their writings. Resisting the 
invitations of Sapir and Gross to place the actuarial within the logic of either discipline or 
governmentality, I contend that the broader genealogical enterprise at the core of 
poststructuralism offers a powerful lens in the study of punishment practices. In the 
context of the actuarial turn, it raises the following set of questions: how did we come to 
believe that predictions of future dangerousness are the proper basis for administering 
just punishment and at what cost to society and the contemporary subject?   
 
 Two final points. First, Sapir is undoubtedly right that clinical prediction—which 
was more closely tied to Foucauldian discipline—operates in a similar way as actuarial 
prediction. There is no operative distinction between the two for purposes of my three 
critiques, so long as the clinical judgment depends on group offending differentials—
which is most often the case. If this condition is met, both clinical judgment and actuarial 
instruments will have similar effects in terms of potential inefficiency, the ratchet effect, 
and distorting our conceptions of just punishment.  The condition, though, is very 
important. The key point that motivates the three critiques is that the profiling methods 
are based on differences in group offending rates.  
 
 Finally, Gross asks at the end of her essay what is wrong with the fact that these 
prediction tools may have been developed in the social sciences, outside the legal realm 
(Gross 2007, __). My critique does, indeed, betray a certain amount of optimism about 
the legal realm, as if only home-spun ideas of justice could possibly be right. My concern 
about exogenous influence, though, does not stem from privileging one discipline over 
the other, but from trepidations regarding the importing and exporting of ideas. 
Discourses in all disciplines develop resistance and counter-resistance through multi-
dimensional processes that involve the contestation and challenging of ideas. (The three 
review essays here are a prime example!) Implants and transplants, in contrast, often take 
place without that same resistance. They often travel without their critiques. Sapir says 
this best when he notes that “One sense in which the Americanization tendency is 
disturbing, is that often ideas and policies travel, but their important critiques stay home” 
(Sapir 2007, __). That is precisely why the exogenous shock of actuarial instruments 
seems problematic to me. The prediction instruments were embraced in the law, but the 
skepticism and critiques stayed at home.   
 
 
II. Clarifying Three Larger Structural Matters in Against Prediction 
 
 The three review essays also raise larger questions about the overall argument in 
Against Prediction. Having revisited the specific critiques in detail, I turn now to these 
structural matters.  
 
A. The Accuracy of Actuarial Instruments 
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Sapir remarks, correctly, that Against Prediction “does not challenge the 
assumption that prediction actually works” (Sapir 2007, __). This raises an important 
structural issue: the entire argument in Against Prediction is premised on one central 
assumption, namely that the actuarial methods developed over the past century and now 
being utilized predict accurately.  
 
Now as I mention in Against Prediction, there are significant questions about the 
reliability and validity of even the most popular actuarial instruments (Harcourt 2007a, 
82-83). Inter-rater consistency scores are often low, as are some validation findings on 
subsequent samples. Even some of the staunchest supporters of actuarial instruments are 
not always particularly sanguine (Monahan and Swanson 2007).  
 
No doubt, another book of the same title could be written challenging the 
assumption of accuracy. That, however, would be a different book, and it would not need 
to address efficiency arguments or selective incapacitation: if the instruments are not 
accurate, there is no possible argument for their use. In this book, I intentionally assumed 
that the instruments work in order to engage the very strongest arguments for prediction. 
Against Prediction joins issue at the very heart of the actuarial turn.9  
 
B. The Relationship Between the Three Critiques 
 
Margalioth also raises an important structural point. He emphasizes that the first 
two critiques are mutually exclusive, and that, together, they are in sharp tension with the 
third. How can we assume, for purposes of the first critique, that individuals are 
responsive to policing, but reject, for purposes of the second critique, all rational choice 
assumptions? Moreover, if we do adopt an efficiency-based cost-benefit approach in the 
first two critiques and “if such an optimal policy calls for the use of profiling,” then, 
Margalioth asks, “why should ‘our conception of just punishment’ matter?” (Margalioth 
2007, __). How do the three critiques function together?    
 
This is an excellent question and it calls for a very precise, though somewhat 
technical answer. In Against Prediction, I offer two immanent critiques of the two 
leading arguments for the use of actuarial methods—the arguments from efficiency and 
selective incapacitation—in order to motivate a genealogical power/knowledge critique 
that explores how we have come to embrace the actuarial despite its likely failures, and at 
what cost. This is a mouth-full, I confess, but it is the most accurate presentation of the 
book.   
 
The first and second critiques are indeed mutually exclusive, but not by accident. 
They rely on contradictory assumptions about human action precisely because they 
respond to the two strongest arguments for profiling—namely, the efficiency and the 
selective incapacitation arguments. These two strongest arguments for profiling are 
                                                 
9 Incidentally, this also explains why the book focuses on actuarial prediction rather than clinical judgment (although I do discuss 
at length the clinical school shooter profile at Harcourt 2007, 291 n.117).There is a general perception today in the United States that 
actuarial instruments are far more accurate and useful than clinical predictions. This is not the case in other countries. Canada, for 
instance, still relies more heavily on clinical models, though the actuarial is on the rise (Vacheret 2005).  
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themselves mutually exclusive: if rational choice assumptions do in fact hold, as per the 
efficiency argument, then profiling will eliminate all offending disparities and there will 
be no selective incapacitation to be had. The two principal arguments for profiling 
themselves rest on incompatible assumptions, and as a result the inverse is true as well: if 
we assume elasticity, profiling will eliminate any offending differentials and thereby 
eliminate the possibility of a ratchet effect. In this sense, the first two internal critiques—
just like the two strongest arguments for profiling—work as critiques “in the alternative.”  
 
Together, the first two critiques motivate the third, more fundamental 
genealogical inquiry: Why have we come to embrace the actuarial turn despite these 
flaws in the arguments? Why do so many believe the efficiency claim despite the lack of 
any evidence regarding comparative elasticities? Why has no one even raised the issue of 
comparative elasticities until now? And why have we failed to appreciate the devastating 
consequences of a potential ratchet effect? The answers to these questions thus form the 
basis of the third critique: we have embraced the actuarial turn, I suggest, because of our 
desire to know the criminal, to categorize and insure against future risk. The intense 
desire for certainty has rendered these actuarial techniques irresistibly seductive—with 
devastating consequences for the core principle of equal treatment at the heart of just 
punishment.10  
 
In sum, the three critiques do work together, but not in classical harmony. The 
first two internal critiques motivate the third and most important intervention.   
 
C. On Race and Prediction 
 
One final major structural issue has to do with the role of race in Against 
Prediction. To drive home a central point of the book—namely that the mathematical and 
cost-benefit problems potentially plague all actuarial methods, not just racial profiling—I 
made the ill-advised and simplifying claim that the problem with racial profiling is not 
race, but profiling. I was trying to move the racial profiling debate from the issue of 
racism to the question of profiling. In her review essay, Gross argues that “Although 
Harcourt insists at the outset that he is telling us a story that is distinct from race—‘the 
problem . . . is about the profiling, not race’—I came away from his book convinced that 
we should tell this as a racial history as well” (Gross 2007, __). Gross sketches a number 
of fruitful directions in which a racial history could go, concluding that “A study of 
criminology and criminal justice practices in the United States simply cannot be divorced 
or disentangled from the history of racial subordination” (Gross:2007:__).   
 
 Gross is right and race does indeed play a key and disturbing role in the history of 
the actuarial. The first parole prediction instrument, developed in 1927 by Ernest 
Burgess, included the race/nationality of the father as one of twenty-one factors that 
predicted success or failure on parole (Harcourt 2007a, 57). Burgess’ model was 
implemented by the Illinois Board of Paroles in 1933 and, as a result, race was used 
                                                 
10 At the 2007 Berlin meeting of the Law & Society Association, Pat O’Malley asked why the desire for certainty had taken the 
shape it had—this embrace of actuarial methods. The answer is complex but, I would suggest, it is integrally tied to our late-modern 
condition, one where rational explanations, social science, and economic ideology have gained ascendance. O’Malley also emphasized 
the political dimensions of this, of which I have no doubt. A whole other book—a fascinating book—could be written on the topic. 
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expressly as one factor in the “prognasio” that served as the basis for the decision 
whether or not to parole an inmate. This continued for many decades. In fact, when 
California began using a parole prediction instrument in the 1970s, it used an actuarial 
device that relied on race. The first California “Base/Expectancy Score” narrowed in on 
race and only three other factors—prior commitments, offense type, and number of 
escapes (Simon 1993, 173). There is no doubt, also, that race motivates our discomfort 
with racial profiling.  
 
Perhaps a much better way to frame the issue of race, then, is not to extricate it 
from the racial profiling equation, but instead to borrow from Lani Guinier and Gerald 
Torres’ metaphor of the miner’s canary (Guinier and Torres 2002). Just like the canary, 
whose distress is a warning that the air in the mine is poisoned, the troubling aspect of 
race in the debate over racial profiling points to the larger problems of profiling for all 
groups. Race is the first place where we see the poison, but it is a poison that affects 
everyone else.  
 
Let me close then by reframing the point. The problems with racial profiling 
involve both race and profiling. Like the canary in the coal mine, the trouble surrounding 
racial profiling alerts us to other problems with the use of actuarial methods more 
generally. The mathematics of profiling and the overlooked detrimental costs to the 
profiled populations affect all profiling techniques, whether they focus on race or 
recidivism, gender or sexual orientation, national origin, or other classifications. We may, 
as a society, decide to apply less scrutiny to some of these classifications than to others, 
but the effects are the same. It is for this reason that the critiques of profiling are so 
relevant today, post 9/11, in a world in which we may increasingly police and punish on 
the basis of religious affiliation or national origin (Harcourt 2007d).  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Thanks to Gross, Margalioth, and Sapir, I can now reformulate with greater 
precision the three critiques that I presented in Against Prediction. First, the actuarial 
methods developed over the twentieth century and being used today rely exclusively on 
differences in offending rates and do not take account of the comparative elasticities of 
the different populations. Because members of different populations may in fact respond 
differently to policing and punishment, the use of existing profiling techniques may 
actually increase overall offending in society. If we had perfect knowledge of 
comparative elasticities and offending rates, then we could administer statistical 
discrimination in a perfectly efficient manner. But that is neither realistic nor likely in 
this lifetime.  
 
Second, if we assume that people are perfectly inelastic to policing, the use of 
existing profiling techniques will cause a ratchet effect on the targeted population with 
devastating consequences on their employment, education, family, and other social 
outcomes. These are costs that are often ignored because the targeted individuals are 
criminally culpable. They are, however, costs that often overwhelm any benefits 
associated with actuarial methods. Selective incapacitation—as one underlying theory of 
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punishment that might justify a ratchet effect—is also problematic because it does not 
treat similarly-situated offenders equally, but instead uses membership in racial, gender, 
or other groups as a way to determine who is similarly situated.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, if rational choice theorists are wrong to extol the 
virtues of profiling and if proponents of selective incapacitation have failed to appreciate 
the devastating consequences on profiled populations, then why have so many people 
come to embrace the actuarial turn—with the limited exception of racial profiling? The 
reason, I suggest, traces to our deep desire to know, our urge to categorize, and our 
impulse to insure against risk. We have been seduced by these techniques, driven by our 
desire for certainty—at the expense of fundamental notions of just punishment. Although 
the actuarial turn fits uncomfortably within the two leading paradigms of Foucauldian 
thought—discipline and governmentality—the actuarial can be profitably understood 
through a will to knowledge lens. These desires to know the criminal, to categorize, and 
to insure are what fuel our continued and misguided quest to predict deviance.  
 
It is for these reasons that I remain against prediction.     
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